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Abstract 
There are inherent limits in classical computation for it to 
serve as an adequate model of human cognition. In particular, 
non-commutativity, while ubiquitous in physics and 
psychology, cannot be sufficiently handled. We propose that 
we need a new mathematics that is capable of expressing 
more complex mathematical structures to tackle those hard X-
problems in cognitive science. A quantum mind approach is 
advocated and we hypothesize a way in which quantum 
computation might be realized in the brain. 
Keywords: Computation, cognition, quantum mind, 
entanglement, non-commutativity 
Introduction 
In 1981, Richard Feynman delivered a keynote talk in the 
first conference on “physics and computation” held at MIT, 
In the talk, entitled “simulating physics with computers”, 
Feynman asked if physics can be simulated by a classical 
universal computer? Given that computers have been 
extensively used for physical simulation and computation at 
that time the question might sound strange. However, 
equipped with some profound new understanding regarding 
Turing computation and quantum mechanics, Feynman 
answered the question with a clear “no”. He concluded, 
“Nature isn't classical, dammit, and if you want to make a 
simulation of Nature, you'd better make it quantum 
mechanical, and by golly it's a wonderful problem, because 
it doesn't look so easy.” (Feynman, 1982). 
We face a similar problem in cognitive science today. The 
tenet of cognition as computation directly catalyzed the 
cognitive revolution in the 1950s and has since become one 
of the pillars of cognitive science (Miller, 2003). 
Undoubtedly, an impressive body of new results have been 
obtained, including the magic number seven  two (Miller, 
1956) and the emergence of executable cognitive 
architectures (e.g., Newell, 1990). On the other hand, 
unfortunately, these advances are in stark contrast with the 
lack of progress in answering some of the long-standing 
tough questions in cognitive science. Theoretically, for 
example, what are the implications of Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem on seeking a computational theory 
of cognition (e.g., Penrose, 1989)? Empirically, some of the 
fundamental psychological phenomena, including 
consciousness, intuition, and various so-called “cognitive 
biases” continue to defy a satisfactory computational 
description. Such theoretical and empirical dilemmas hint at 
“the unreasonable ineffectiveness of mathematics in 
cognitive science” (Poli, 1999) and partially explains the 
finding that in recent years cognitive science has been more 
and more dominated by empirical psychology (and less 
computational explorations) (Gentner, 2010). In a sense, we 
are forced to re-examine the relationship between cognition 
and computation and answer a similar question asked by 
Feynman in 1981: Can we simulate cognition by a 
computer? If so, what kind of computer are we going to 
use? 
The issue is also of particular importance in the light of 
the recent resurgence of AI. Unprecedented capacities in 
various areas including machine vision, natural language 
processing, and game playing have been recently gained 
thanks to the advances in deep learning methods. Can we 
realize human-level intelligence by deep mining big data 
using deep learning with more powerful computers? Can 
deep learning technology finally lead to intuition and 
consciousness in artificial systems? 
Here we intend to provide some general arguments 
towards answering these questions. In particular, we argue 
that human cognition involves more complex mathematical 
structures (e.g., non-commutativity) that are fundamentally 
beyond the expressive power of classical Turing computers. 
Consequentially, in order to develop a simultaneously 
normative and descriptive theory of cognition one has to go 
beyond classical set-theoretical computation. We 
demonstrate how formalisms in quantum theory affords 
structures necessary for us to model interesting cognitive 
phenomena. Finally, we address a common criticism of the 
quantum brain approach and suggest a way where quantum 
behavior might be realized in a warm, wet, and noisy brain. 
We conclude by advocating that we need to go beyond 
classical computers for cognitive modeling in order to gain 
brand new insights about how the brain and the mind work. 
The Inadequacy of Classical Computation for 
Cognition 
Although the limits of the classical theory of computation 
theory have been well-known since its inception, computers 
can do so much nowadays that it’s easy to forget that they 
were invented for what they could not do. In his 1937 paper, 
“On computable numbers, with an application to the 
Entscheidungs problem,” Alan Turing defined the notion of 
a universal digital computer (a Turing machine), and his 
goal was to show that there were tasks that even the most 
powerful computing machine could not perform (for 
example, the halting problem). These problems are simply 
beyond traditional computation, in accordance with the 
now-famous Turing-Church thesis. 
A similar result was obtained at about the same time by 
Kurt Gödel. In 1931, through an ingenious device known as 
Gödel numbering, Gödel found a way to assign natural 
numbers in a unique way to the statements of arithmetic 
themselves, effectively turning numbers into talking about 
numbers. This permitted him to prove an incompleteness 
theorem, which basically says that there are true statements 
of mathematics (theorems) which we can never formally 
know to be true.   
It is interesting that although both Turing and Gödel 
proved that the complete body of human knowledge cannot 
be acquired by formal computation alone given the 
method’s inherent limits (see Figure 1), they appear to offer 
different reasons for how the human mind might be able to 
achieve the feat. According to Turing, it is unfair to 
compare a Turing machine and a human mind – the former 
runs algorithmically and never makes mistakes and the latter 
does “trial-and-error” and makes wild guess all the time. “If 
a machine is expected to be infallible, it cannot also be 
intelligent”. And a machine can become intelligent and 
human-like only if it makes no pretense at infallibility. 
Gödel, on the other hand, did not want to give up on the 
consistency of human knowledge. He suggested that “it 
remains possible that there may exist (and even be 
empirically discovered) a theorem-proving machine which 
in fact is equivalent to mathematical intuition, but cannot be 
proved to be so, nor can be proved to yield only correct 
theorems of finitary number theory”.  
 Figure 1. A hypothetical problem complexity space. 
 
In the end of his now famous 1960 article entitled “The 
unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural 
sciences”, Eugene Wigner wondered “if we could, some 
day, establish a [mathematical] theory of the phenomena of 
consciousness, or of biology, which would be as coherent 
and convincing as our present theories of the inanimate 
world”. Half a century later, Wigner’s hope apparently 
hasn’t been fulfilled. The list of “cognitive biases” on 
Wikipedia is getting longer and longer. Human 
“irrationality” seems everywhere. Of course irrationality in 
all these cases is defined as human deviation from a Turing 
like computational representation of the problem to be 
solved, and decades of research in psychology appears to 
show beyond doubt that such deviation is systematic and 
abundant. The discrepancy shown in Figure 1 hints at an 
explanation: we might have used a mathematics that is not 
powerful enough to capture all the interesting complexity of 
human cognition. 
There have been efforts to extend the classical theory of 
computation – its history is almost as long as the classical 
computational theory itself. Various models of computation 
that can compute functions not effectively computable in the 
Church-Turing thesis sense, often called hypercomputation 
or super-Turing computation, have been suggested. (see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation).  
One notable hypercomputational model is the Blum-
Shub-Smale (BSS) machine (Blum et al., 1997), also called 
a real computer. As we know, a classical computer depends 
on discrete symbols (e.g., 0s and 1s) to encode information 
and presupposes that all the underlying sets are countable 
(one-to-one correspondence to natural numbers N). A real 
computer is able to handle real numbers (R, a continuum) 
and therefore can answer questions about subsets which are 
uncountable (e.g., “is the Mandelbrot set decidable?”). 
While it has been shown that real computation can be 
directly applied to problems in numerical analysis and 
scientific computing, it is not clear if it reduces the 
discrepancy shown in Figure 1 in any fundamental way. We 
argue that the extension from N to R, as significant as it 
may seem, remains inadequate to handle some of the 
toughest problems (X-problems) in cognitive science.  
X-problems and Non-Commutative 
Observables 
Following Penrose’s practice in physics, it is helpful to 
distinguish two classes of problems in cognitive science that 
long for answers (Penrose, 1997). One class can be called Z-
problems (for puZZle), which refer to those empirical 
findings that are puzzling but somewhat explainable in 
classical computational terms. Examples of Z-problem 
include the distinction of short-term memory and long-term 
memory, the concept of working memory capacity, skill 
acquisition by forming and tuning if-then production rules, 
and attention through bottom-up and top-down controls. 
Another class of problems can be called X-problems (for 
paradoXes), referring to those empirical findings that are so 
magical and mysterious that they seem to defy classical 
mathematical descriptions. Examples of this class include 
consciousness and awareness, intuition, feeling, gestalt 
phenomena in visual perception, and various so-called 
“cognitive biases” in human judgment and decision-making, 
to name a few. Discrediting them as ephemeral and 
unworthy, or simply labeling them as “human biases and 
heuristics”, or suggesting ad-hoc patched explanations, 
seems inadequate. These phenomena are functions of the 
human brain and the body that resulted from millions of 
years of evolution and adaption. It is fair to say that 
cognitive science so far has fallen short in providing more 
rigorous and more systematic answers to X-problems. 
Tackling X-problems requires us to clearly recognize the 
fundamental limits of the currently dominating classical 
theory of computation as a model of human cognition and 
seek a new mathematics that can describe human behavior 
rather than treat human behavior as exceptions or 
deviations.  
What the new mathematics will look like remains to 
explored. One necessary condition is that it has to be 
equipped with extra non-trivial hidden mathematical 
structures that can afford complex emerging phenomena. In 
this paper we are advocating a particular aspect of new 
mathematics that we deem essential and even magical to 
tackle some of the X-problems in cognitive science. This 
aspect has to do with non-commuting observables. Briefly, 
non-commutativity (e.g., ab  ba) is ubiquitous in physics 
and psychology, but the classical theories of computation, 
operating on the 1-dimensional real space (N in Turing 
computer and R in real computation), leaves little if any 
room for non-commutativity.  
Generally speaking, commutativity concerns the order 
effect of an operation. We may tend to think that 
commutativity is a normalcy (for example, we learn in 
schools that number multiplication is commutative, 
2x3=3x2) but not all operations in nature are commutative. 
In fact, in mathematics commutativity is typically just a nice 
feature that needs to be specially denoted. For example, in a 
canonical group, a mathematical structure where a 
multiplication is defined among a set of elements, 
commutativity is not required. Those special groups where 
multiplication is commutative are then called abelian 
groups. In mathematics, a commutator can be defined to 
indicate the extent to which a certain binary operation fails 
to be commutative.  
Non-commutativity is abundant in physics. As a matter of 
fact, realizing that observables can be non-commuting and 
developing mathematical formalism that can handle non-
commutative variables have been some of the most 
important achievements that directly catalyzed the birth of 
quantum physics about a century ago. Given the remarkable 
similarity to the situation we face in cognitive science today, 
let us elaborate a little. 
We know that mechanics concerns the movement of 
objects in space and time. Two variables are used to 
describe the state of a moving object, the position (x, 
assuming a 1-dimensional space here) and the velocity (v). 
In the Hamiltonian formalization of classical mechanics, 
velocity is replaced by momentum p (=mv). Therefore the 
state of the system can be completely represented by a point 
in so-called phase space, which in this case is just a 2-
dimensional (x and p) manifold. And the dynamics is 
governed by a smooth Hamiltonian function, H(p,x), 
defined on the manifold.  
This classical picture of mechanics basically treats x and 
p as if they are two independent variables, and each can be 
independently measured. One of the key insights that fueled 
the mathematical basis of the quantum revolution is the 
realization that x and p are not independent. In fact, in 
quantum mechanics p is identified with a differential 
operator with respect to the position. With details omitted, 
the consequence of doing so is that x and p are non-
commuting variables, and their relationship can be 
summarized as a remarkable and non-zero commutator: 
 where i is the imaginary unit, ԰ is the reduced Planck 
constant. We cannot over-emphasize the importance of this 
relation. This relation leads (or is equivalent) to many 
essential principles of quantum physics, such as the 
Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and directly gives rise to a 
range of quantum phenomena (e.g., the wave-particle 
duality). 
The non-commuting relation between x and p is no 
accident. They reflect some of the fundamental conjugating 
relations in nature, such as movement vs stillness, time and 
energy, global vs local, differentiation vs integration. It is 
only remarkable that they are linked by such fundamental 
constants as i and ԰.	 Together	 they	 depict	 a	 multi‐
dimensional	non‐flat	geometry	of	the	physical	world. 
It would have been unfortunate if psychology were not 
full of such non-commuting observables. Mental objects can 
only be more complex and possibly live in a higher-
dimensional spacetime. In a psychological experiment (as 
well as in everyday experience), we measure and recollect 
many variables – judgment on question 1, decision on 
question 2, reaction time for trial x, accuracy for person y, 
feeling on day z, etc. Then we do statistics on these 
variables. We treat them as if they live on a huge Cartesian 
product space and each dimension is independent of another 
(which is multi-dimensional in appearance, but can be 
projected to 1-dimensional N via Gödel numbering). Doing 
so greatly reduces dimensionality and conceals/distorts the 
structures. Occasionally the non-commuting nature of 
variables somehow reveals itself in statistical results one 
way or another, which we then dismiss as cognitive biases, 
intuition, satisficing, or human irrationality. 
A new mathematics of human cognition therefore calls for 
that we go beyond the symbolic set-theoretical classical 
theory of computation, and treat non-commuting 
observables in psychology seriously in order to truly 
describe rather than prescribe human cognition. Fortunately, 
we probably don’t have to develop a brand-new 
mathematics and can start with some remarkable techniques 
mathematicians and physicists developed in the past two 
centuries or so that can handle non-flat spaces of various 
dimensions. A quantum information theoretical approach to 
cognition is a worthy choice. 
Towards a Quantum Mind 
Attempting to understand the mind from a quantum 
theoretical perspective is not new. Wolfgang Pauli’s joint 
adventure with Carl Jung in 1930s in studying synchronicity 
and telepathy has been well known. Erwin Schrodinger, a 
founder of quantum physics, studied “what is life” in 1944 
and delivered the Tarner Lectures on “Mind and Matter” in 
Cambridge in 1954. David Bohm and Rogers Penrose, both 
prominent physicists, pioneered more modern efforts to 
understand what consciousness is and how it arises in the 
brain from a quantum-theoretical perspective (Bohm, 1980; 
Penrose, 1989). More recently, Jerome Busemeyer and 
colleagues have been promoting a quantum cognition 
movement (Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012), and Matthew 
Fisher has proposed a quantum brain project (Fisher, 2015).  
Our new math is so motivated by and consistent with 
quantum physics and quantum information theory (Nielsen 
and Chuang, 2000) that we certainly do not mind to align 
ourselves with this distinguished group of researchers in 
advocating a general quantum approach to the brain and the 
mind. However, we would like to make the following 
general distinction. 
First, our goal is to seek a new mathematical theory of the 
human mind that is simultaneously normative (self-
consistent, systematic, rather than patched), descriptive 
(descriptive rather than prescriptive of human behavior), 
and biologically realistic (neutrally implementable). Our 
theory presupposes a high-dimensional non-flat mental 
space that cannot be reduced to lower dimensions without 
losing information. This is consistent with the quantum 
formalism of physics. We take quantum theory seriously but 
not literally since we are dealing with mental space, which 
is likely quite different from physical space. 
Second, we are serious exploring about how our quantum 
computation theory can be realized biologically in the 
human brain. It is in this aspect we are different from the 
more behavior-focused quantum cognition approach. For 
example, Busemeyer clearly stated, “We are not interested 
in physics; neither do we claim the brain is a quantum 
computer. Our interest lies solely in the application of 
mathematical principles from quantum probability theory to 
behavioral data observed in social and behavioral sciences”.  
Third, while we claim that the brain is a quantum 
computer, we do not propose at this stage how it is literally 
true from a quantum level of phenomena. We are aware of 
rather heated debates regarding this issue. Our position is 
that we do not need, at least until we know more about 
neuroscience, to identify an atomic or molecular level of 
mechanisms for quantum realization in the brain. Instead, 
we suggest that because the brain has so many neurons, each 
of which computes in its own frame of reference, quantum 
like behavior emerges naturally when all sub-systems have 
to be integrated at a higher level. We will briefly discuss the 
issue later. 
In the rest of the paper, we will provide a case study to 
demonstrate how tossing a fair coin, probably the simplest 
kind of mental event, can be represented in a quantum mind, 
and why the gambler’s fallacy is a quantum like behavior, 
and how it could emerge in the human brain. 
Coin Tossing in a Quantum Mind  
Tossing a coin, which could land on head (H) or tail (T), is 
modeled by a bit in classical theory. The whole phase space 
consists of two points (on R), 0 (for H) and 1 (for T). 
Tossing a fair coin can be represented by a state with binary 
choices, H and T, each with a ½ probability. Formally,  
 S = ½ H + ½ T 
In quantum theory, a coin tossing can be represented by a 
Qbit (a quantum bit), which lives in a complex 2-
dimensional Hilbert space (see Figure 2). Every point on the 
Bloch sphere is a possible state of a Qbit. A Qbit is similar 
to a classic bit in that when measured it reveals itself as 0 or 
1. However, roughly speaking, a Qbit contains much more 
(quantum) information than a classic bit – every point (there 
are infinite number of them) on the equator unit circle of the 
Bloch sphere represents a possible state of fair coin tossing. 
So tossing a fair coin can be represented equally well by the 
following two states (among infinitely others). 
 These representations are called wavefunctions, and these 
coefficients are complex numbers, whose modulus squared 
represents a corresponding probability.  
 Figure 2. Bloch sphere representation of a quantum bit. 
 
You may wonder what is the use of these additional 
degrees of freedom. They seem to represent phase 
information, which is supposed to live on a different 
dimension. The resulting states are traditionally translated to 
something like, “the coin is at a superposition state of heads 
and tails at the same time”. This kind of description causes a 
lot of confusion for non-quantum physicists. It seems that 
our natural language lacks the necessary expressive power 
to even describe these intimately confounded states, let 
alone to distinguish them. The problem is, can our brain? 
How about our (conscious or unconscious) mind? And what 
is the possible psychological relevance of the phase, if any?  
Any fair-minded psychologist would probably quickly 
reject this nonsense: “why do I need an infinite number of 
possible states to represent a simple half-and-half coin 
tossing, which I even do not know how to tell them apart?” 
This is certainly a fair question, and here are some counter-
arguments. First of all, the brain has so many neurons, and 
we do not know, based on our current knowledge of 
neuroscience, how each one works and what it is really 
representing. It is certainly possible that the phase 
information is represented somehow by neurons or neuron 
groups. Second, unlike experimental quantum physicists 
who design sophisticated and expensive apparatus that 
allow them to do various precise and fine-grained 
measurement on quantum particles in their labs, 
psychologists are far inferior in their capacity to measure 
neuron or mind states. Tools in their arsenal, inlcuding 
introspection, verbal report, reaction time, or even 
neuroimaging (fMRI or EEG), often lead to rough, coarse, 
imprecise, and indirect measures. Despite this deficit, it is 
still possible that this extra hidden phase information may 
manage to reveal itself in some ways that can be detected 
empirically, if we look carefully. We would like to argue 
that the Gambler’s fallacy is such a manifestation. 
Gambler’s Fallacy is a Quantum Phenomenon 
Suppose you see an H when you toss a fair coin. Which side 
do you think the coin will land on in your next toss? 
Classical probability theory will predict a 50-50 chance for 
H and T (as it is apparently an independent Bernoulli 
process). But a large body of empirical research has robustly 
shown that people tend to think that T is more likely 
(p0.6), committing a so-called Gambler’s Fallacy. In 
general, it refers to the belief that chance is a self-correcting 
process where a random event is more likely to occur 
because it has not happened for a period of time. For 
decades, this fallacy has been regarded as a prime example 
of human irrationality and thought to have originated from a 
cognitive bias called the “representativeness heuristic” 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Efforts to patch classical 
probability theory to explain the phenomenon have been 
unsatisfactory (e.g., Hahn and Warren, 2009; also see Sun, 
Tweney, and Wang, 2010). 
But chance is not the only observable for an uncertain 
state of an object. It is also possible to measure the state in 
time. The difference between chance (measuring how likely 
an event is to occur) and time (measuring when an event is 
to occur) can be better revealed by examining this question, 
is a more likely event going to happen sooner? Common 
reasoning may lead to a positive answer. But it turns out that 
chance and time are really two different measures for an 
uncertain event – they are not always correlated. In 
particular, it can be shown that while for a fair coin HH (two 
heads in a row) and HT (a head followed by a tail) are 
equally likely (p=1/4), their waiting time is different: on 
average, it takes 4 tosses to see the first HT but it takes 6 
tosses to see the first HH. Somehow HH is harder to come 
by than HT even though they have the same chance (Sun & 
Wang, 2010a; Sun & Wang, 2010b).  
More critically, it seems that chance and waiting time are 
really two non-commuting variables. While both variables 
concern the temporal distance between the consecutive re-
occurrence of an uncertain event, the former measures the 
mean distance and the latter measures its variance. Variance 
can be regarded as a phase factor. For a classical coin, the 
non-commutativity of the two variables may not induce any 
observable effects for any single toss, when two consecutive 
tosses are examined together, phase factors manifest an 
observable difference in terms of waiting time. 
One may wonder why we have to examine two 
consecutive tosses together when we were taught (and we 
believed) that the two tosses are completely independent 
and identical Bernoulli trials. Where does the emerging 
effect come from? If we say that the seemingly mysterious 
connection between the two consecutive and classically 
perfectly independent coin tosses comes from quantum 
entanglement, people may be suspicious. But according to 
quantum physics, there are actually many more quantum 
entangled states than quantum un-entangled states. In this 
case, it can be shown that simply by pondering in the mind 
if the two independent tosses will be landing on the same 
(or different) side is enough to entangle the two tosses (Sun 
et al., 2018). Formally, let us then use  
 to represent a single fair coin toss. A pair of two consecutive 
independent tosses can be represented as a product state that 
contains no correlation, 
 For neurons to represent the state that the two tosses will 
land on the same side (HH or TT), the measurement can be 
represented as a projector: 
 It is remarkable that when we apply the projector to |> we 
obtain a maximally entangled state: 
 This exercise demonstrates that quantum entanglement is 
not hard to come by in the mind if we treat various 
hypothesis generation processes as intermediate 
measurements. And our mind is doing hypothesis generation 
all the time, a process called abduction. Under certain 
conditions, originally hidden information starts to reveal 
itself through an observable effect, leading to the Gambler’s 
fallacy.  
Gambler’s Fallacy in the Brain 
Question remains regarding if and how such quantum 
operations can be realized in the human brain. Quantum 
computation with true quantum level devices seems to 
require strictly isolated physical environments which the 
brain lacks. Several proposals exist. A well-known one is 
the Orch-OR theory proposed by Penrose and Hameroff (see 
Hameroff and Penrose, 2014 for a recent review). 
According to this theory, quantum computation takes place 
in microtubules in neurons and periodically orchestrated 
objective reduction occurs due to quantum gravity which 
gives rise to consciousness. The theory is seriously 
challenged by Max Tegmark, a MIT physicist, whose 
calculation shows that in the brain’s hot, wet and noisy 
environment quantum coherence won’t last longer than 10-20 
of a second, too short for the proposed mechanism to work 
(Tegmark, 1999). The debate, sometimes personal, 
continues as of today. 
More recently, Fisher explored the possibility of quantum 
processing in the brain with nuclear spins. In particular, 
phosphorus is identified as the unique biological element 
with a nuclear spin that can serve as a neural qubit. Using 
the Posner molecule, they show that the neural qubits 
entanglement can be protected for much longer time (e.g., 
minutes and hours) and thereby can serve as a (working) 
quantum-memory. 
Remarkably, according to the idea we suggested above, it 
seems that we don’t have to go to atomic and molecular 
levels to see if the brain is a quantum computer. It is 
possible that we can observe traces of quantum computation 
at the neuron or neural networks levels. One of our early 
works seems to support this hypothesis (Sun et al., 2015). 
 
 Figure 3. A biologically realistic neural network model 
reported in Sun et al. (2015). Initially undifferentiated 
hidden neurons started to differentiate after experiencing 
sequences of binary events. 
 
Briefly, we developed a simple biologically-realistic 
recurrent neural network, and trained it, via unsupervised 
Hebbian learning, on binary sequences of random coin 
tossing (see Figure 3). We found that with training initially 
undifferentiated hidden neurons started to differentiate – 
some became H detectors and some became T detectors. 
Critically, through an activation-based receptive field 
analysis, we also found neurons that seemed to be sensitive 
to consecutive tosses. In particular, some neurons were 
more sensitive to repetition (R) (HH or TT), and some 
neurons were more sensitive to alternation (A) (HT or TH). 
Somehow it appears that the brain, through overlapping 
neuron groups, had automatically entangled consecutive 
inputs. Most remarkably, when we counted the number of R 
detectors and the number of A detectors in the hidden layer, 
we found an R/A ratio of 0.7, indicating that there were 
more A detectors than H detectors. This is “paradoxical” 
since the chance of R and A were exactly the same in the 
input sequences! However, we have shown that the ratio 
was perfectly correlated with the waiting time statistics of 
respective patterns of tosses for a fair coin, suggesting that 
the neural network learned to be prone to the Gambler’s 
fallacy just as humans are. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we advocate that a new mathematics is needed 
to tackle X-problems in cognitive science. A quantum mind 
approach is explored. We show that the quantum formalism 
affords the capacity to represent mathematical structures 
that are more complex than those permitted by the classical 
theory of computation. In particular, we show that non-
commutativity, while ubiquitous in physics and psychology, 
cannot be adequately handled by Turing computers. We 
propose that the brain performs quantum computation and 
that we should use quantum computation to simulate the 
mind. 
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